Showing posts with label specialty strategy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label specialty strategy. Show all posts

Saturday, May 10, 2014

Porter’s Five Forces Model, Generic Strategies and the Saddle Curve



Most students of strategic planning are at least aware of Michael Porter’s five forces model of competitive advantage.  These forces – supplier power, customer power, threat of new entry, substitute products and industry rivalry – are an excellent way to understand the most powerful forces affecting a company’s competitive position and likelihood of profiting from a market.  In Simplified Strategic Planning, we examine the external variables which are most like to drive these forces for a company by researching the external data (such as the balance between number of customers and number of competitors in a segment, the threat of substitute products or services, and the economics of the supplier market).  Internally, a company’s strategy can be developed to adapt to, and sometimes, mold these forces as well, ideally by focusing on the use of a unique strategic competency that separates the company from competition and likely new entrants.
One great way to think about all of the five forces in your strategic planning is to think about the choices (outside of purchasing from your company) available to your customers and suppliers.  Anything that increases the choices available to customers decreases your power, and anything that decreases their choices increases your power.  

One of the key ideas we use in Simplified Strategic Planning starts with the basic question of how you can gain – or lose – market share to a competitor.  One of the most fundamental insights that affects market share is a behavior continuum we refer to as specialty and commodity behavior.  Michael Porter describes these behaviors in his “generic strategies”, but usually refers to them as “uniqueness as perceived by the customer” and “low cost position”.  As I state in the book “Simplified Strategic Planning:  A No-Nonsense Guide for Busy People Who Want Results”, both of the generic strategies that work for the specialty focused company are viable strategies for a profitable business – that is, the differentiation strategy (specialty/broad market) and part of what Porter calls the “focus” strategy (which he uses to cover both specialty and commodity/niche market).  I would contend that the commodity side of Porter’s “focus” strategy (what I call “alley shop”) is not viable – since it generally results in both low volume and low margins – and that is why we split the niche strategies into “segmentation” and “alley shop”.

saddle curve for strategic planningIn “Simplified Strategic Planning”, I noted the existence of the “Saddle Curve”, which is simply the tendency of companies to achieve higher profit on either end of the specialty/commodity continuum.  The basic idea behind this curve is that companies with a clear commodity or specialty strategy will be more profitable than those that flounder in between the two.  One of the reasons why the five forces exert such power on profitable strategies is that they tend to force companies away from the extremes of this curve and into the middle, where profit is minimized.  As an example, consider a situation where customers can choose substitute products.  The customers’ desire is inevitably to maximize value by getting better products, better service and lower prices.  Where the customer has less choice, the real-world trade-off between these can be forced into the customers’ decision-making processes (“Do I buy the expensive, better product or the cheaper, worse product?”).  Customers who have more choices can demand that these compromises not be made – which inevitable drives a company into the middle of the curve, where profit is lower.  The only force that usually does not show its main effect on the saddle curve is the power of suppliers.  When that force comes into play, the profit of the company is affected because profit can be the result of forcing suppliers to move towards the center of the curve.
Where do you see your company on this curve?  How do the five forces affect your position on the curve, and your strategies for positioning in your markets?  If you would like a straightforward, no-nonsense process for working these ideas into your strategic planning, consider attending our two-day simplified strategic planning seminar soon!

Wednesday, May 04, 2011

Is Retail Strategy different from other strategy?

When I do public strategic planning programs for a broad audience, I am sometimes asked “Is strategic planning for a retail business different from strategic planning for a different kind of business, such as a manufacturer?” The answer, not surprisingly, is “yes AND no”. The differences and similarities may surprise you.

To begin with, the “product” of a retail store is different from most product and service creating businesses in that it is not part of a discrete transaction conducted with the customer – that is, as a retailer, you do not get a separate payment from your customer for the value you produce. Instead, you always (or almost always) make money on payments from your customers for goods and/or services produced by others. Of course, there are exceptions – for example, if you do food preparation on your premises, you are getting paid directly for that value – but in most cases, retailers make their money on the markup on the goods and/or services they are selling.

To put a finer point on this distinction, as a retailer you get some compensation from customers – largely for the experience you generate around their purchase – and some compensation from suppliers – largely for the infrastructure you provide for their distribution. How much compensation comes from either source is a tangled topic we can address elsewhere, but the point is, you make your money as a retailer by providing infrastructure and experience.

And here is one place where strategic planning for retailers is just like strategy done for anyone else: as a rule, the more easily a service/product can be measured and duplicated, the harder it is to sell it as a specialty. In retail, the value of infrastructure is exactly that – something that is easily measured and duplicated. This is not always so – a huge distribution network like Wal-Mart’s is hard to duplicate, and so is a highly specialized semi-monopoly network like Duty Free America. Still, for most suppliers, access to customers through one infrastructure network is pretty much the same as the others. For customers, however, the differences can be notable and – in the eye of the customer – worth quite a bit.

If you run a retail business, where do your stores stand? Do you sell an experience or infrastructure? How does your strategic competency add to your uniqueness and the value you create for your customers?

Friday, December 03, 2010

Strategic Planning: The "disappearing middle" of the job market

A common question in strategic planning revolves around the strong profitability of clear, focused specialty and commodity strategies. Apparently, this is becoming a factor in the labor market, as well.
An article in The Lookout on Yahoo notes that there is a "disappearing middle" in the job market. This trend - growth in lower-tier unskilled jobs and upper-tier skilled jobs, looks suspiciously like the "saddle curve" we use to explain the profit impact of pursuing specialty and commodity strategies. Is is possible that the labor market is now coming to reflect the same specialty and commodity tendencies we have observed in other markets? An interesting question is: why has this tendency not been apparent in the past? Strategically, you should ask yourself: is my company employing specialty employees or commodity employees - and how does that fit with our strategic planning?